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CASE NOTES
violate public policy. The approval of these waivers by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code should lead to a wider adoption of this liberal view.
LAWRENCE A. KLINGER
Constitutional Law—State Wages & Hours Act—Equal Protection of
the Laws.—Peterson v. Hagan.'—The Fair Labor Standards Act, 2 which
establishes a maximum straight-time work week of forty hours for employees
engaged in interstate commerce, gives to the states authority to fix a maxi-
mum straight-time work week lower than that created by the Federal Act. 3
The State of Washington passed a Wages and Hours Act, 4 covering em-
ployees in local commerce, which established an eight hour maximum work
day after which overtime was to be paid, or a forty hour work week, to
be selected at the option of individual employees.' The State Act expressly
exempted those subject to the terms of the Federal Act from coverage
under the higher standards of the State Act." Respondent employers'
sought under the Declaratory Judgment Act of Washingtons to enjoin the
enforcement of the State Act alleging it to be in its application to them
an unconstitutional denial of the equal protection of the laws. This allega-
tion was apparently grounded on the theory that the action of the State
in failing to fully utilize the authority granted it by Congress, would force
respondents who, it was stipulated, were not engaged in either the produc-
tion of goods for interstate commerce or in interstate commerce itself
and therefore not subject to the Federal Act, to maintain an overtime wage
scale based on different standards than those provided by the Federal Act for
employers engaged in interstate commerce within the State of Washington.
The Washington Supreme Court, affirmed the decision of the Superior
Court, HELD: § 3 of the State Act is unconstitutional." The failure of the
State legislature, under the power granted by Congress to legislate for all
Washington businesses whether inter or intra state, to apply its wages and
hours regulations to such employees engaged in "identical"" businesses, sep-
arated only by the "accident of interstate commerce" amounts to dis-
1 351 P.2d 127 (Wash. 1960).
2 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 USC § 201 et seq. (1958), herein called the Federal Act.
3 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 USC § 218 (1958).
4 Wash. Rev. Code § 49.46 (Supp. 1959), herein called the State Act.
5 Wash. Rev. Code § 4946.030 (Supp. 1959).
6 Ibid.
7 Ivy Peterson, doing business as Bellevue Sanatorium; Kauffman Buick Company,
Inc.; Top-Hat Cafe, Inc.; David L. Reiff, doing business as Acme Personnel Service.
This action is a consolidation of four separate actions below.
8 Wash. Rev. Code § 7.24 (Supp. 1956).
0 Also held unconstitutional by the Court, as an unlawful delegation of legislative
power, was Wash. Rev. Code § 49.46.050, It will not be treated in the context of this
note.
10 Peterson v. Hagan, supra note I at 133.
II Ibid.
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criminatory legislation and denies to respondents the equal protection of
the laws.
The two central theses of the decision appear at variance with accepted
United States Supreme Court rulings.' 2 Only if interstate commerce is an ac-
cident, in the sense that it does not furnish a reasonable basis for classifica-
tion, and in addition only if a state must legislate when Congress has granted
it permission to legislate, could the result be justified. The history of the
Supreme Court rulings since 1824" has emphasized the basic distinctions
between local and interstate commerce. In granting to Congress the sole
power to regulate interstate commerce, the Constitution" itself dramatizes
these distinctions. A large part of the history of commerce clause litigation
is, in fact, a history of the development of the concept of interstate, as
contrasted with purely local, commerce. Congress has not failed to regulate
and control interstate commerce; such federal legislation as that in the
instant case is based on the Constitutional directive. Congress, then, and
the Constitution are the sources from which the lines of classification fol-
lowed by the Washington legislature stem. It has been held that "the rule
established by Congress on this subject, in and of itself, furnishes a
reasonable basis for classification in a state law. . . "15 It is clear that
statutory discrimination, to be declared constitutional within the context
of the Equal Protection Clause, must be reasonably related to the purposes
of the Act in which it is found." More specifically, the Supreme Court
has held that "distinctions in the treatment of business entities engaged in
the same business activity may be justified by genuinely different character-
istics of the businesses involved."" Even assuming that the Washington law
as enacted could have been applied to those employers coming within
the scope of the Federal Act," the question of legislative prerogative in
police legislation still remains. The United States Supreme Court has
spoken of "the well established principle that the legislature is not bound,
in order to support the constitutional validity of its regulation to extend it
to all cases which it might possibly reach." 19 This would indicate that the
right to legislate for those within the scope of the Federal Act can not be
equated with a constitutional duty to so legislate.
The validity of the State Act is further demonstrated by the often
12 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197 (1923) ; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915).
'' Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
14 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
15 Terrace v. Thompson, supra note 12.
38
 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1954).
17
 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cu!ten, 31S U.S. 313 (1942).
18 The assumption referred to was accepted as basic to the argument used by the
court in the instant case; the dissent (at 139) indicates grave doubt as to the propriety
of such an assumption because the Federal Act uses the work-week as its standard,
while the State Act follows a work-day requirement. Either position seems academic in
light of Miller v. Wilson, and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, supra note 12.
18 Miller v. Wilson, supra note 12, at 284, cited with approval in West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish, supra note 12, at 400.
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expressed attitude of the Supreme Court in allowing state legislative bodies
a wide scope of discretion in the adoption of their police laws. 2° It is, at this
time, necessary to recall that "the prohibition of the Equal Protection
Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination." 21
The determination of the Washington legislature to follow the con-
stitutional distinction between local and interstate commerce and its
express rejection of the opportunity offered by the Federal Act to obliterate
the distinction in this specific area of regulation, was not an unreasonable
or abritrary course, but was a classic state legislative action following the
basic constitutional guide lines previously demonstrated as acceptable to the
United States Supreme Court and was an affirmation of the right, protected
by the Tenth Amendment, of a state government to legislate within an
area reserved for it and, as such, beyond the reach of federal action.
The case as decided by the State Supreme Court will probably be
ineffective as precedent beyond Washington. The Supreme Court of the
United States adheres to the self-imposed principle that it will not review
a state court judgment based upon an adequate and independent non-
federal question, even though a federal question be involved and wrongly
decided.22 The case relies in part upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
state constitutionn which, it seems clear, is broad enough, standing alone,
to sustain the Washington Court's judgment. This is so notwithstanding
the fact that the Court relied basically on Federal reports in its interpretation
of this equal protection problem.
BARRY J. WALKER
Contracts—Acceptance—Rendering of Act where Promise Requested.—
Allied Steel and Conveyers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company. 1 —Following
contracts for the sale and installation of machinery executed and performed
by the parties, the buyer submitted to the seller a so-called "Amendment
number 2" which proposed the purchase of additional machinery to be in-
stalled by the seller on the buyer's premises. Although designated an
amendment, the proposal was in effect a purchase order for a new contract
substantially similar in form to the previous ones between the parties.
Amendment No. 2, which provided that the acceptance of the proposal
should be "executed on the acknowledgment copy," contained a printed
form of a broad indemnity clause which, unlike the identical provision con-
tained in the same form in previous purchase orders, was not marked
"VOID." A further provision stated that the terms and conditions "incon-
sistent with the provisions herein above set forth are hereby superseded."
Before the acknowledgment copy was returned to the buyer, the seller began
20 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 62, 78 (1910).
21 Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
22 Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
2 :1 Wash. Coast. art. I,	 12.
1 277 F,2d 907 (8th Cir. 1960).
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